The wisdom of many in one mind: Improving individual judgments with dialectical bootstrapping by Herzog, S. & Hertwig, R.
Research Article
TheWisdomofMany inOneMind
Improving Individual Judgments With Dialectical
Bootstrapping
Stefan M. Herzog and Ralph Hertwig
University of Basel
ABSTRACT—The ‘‘wisdom of crowds’’ in making judgments
about the future or other unknown events is well estab-
lished. The average quantitative estimate of a group of
individuals is consistently more accurate than the typical
estimate, and is sometimes even the best estimate. Although
individuals’ estimates may be riddled with errors, aver-
aging them boosts accuracy because both systematic and
random errors tend to cancel out across individuals. We
propose exploiting the power of averaging to improve
estimates generated by a single person by using an ap-
proach we call dialectical bootstrapping. Specifically, it
should be possible to reduce a person’s error by averaging
his or her first estimate with a second one that harks back
to somewhat different knowledge. We derive conditions
under which dialectical bootstrapping fosters accuracy
and provide an empirical demonstration that its benefits go
beyond reliability gains. A single mind can thus simulate
the wisdom of many.
Forecasting the future has long been believed to be the pre-
rogative of a select few, such as the Oracle of Delphi, Roman
augurs, and modern investment gurus such as Warren Buffett.
When pooled, however, ordinary people’s forecasts about ev-
erything from election and sports-event outcomes to the reve-
nues of the next Hollywood blockbuster have enormous
predictive accuracy (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004). Moreover,
when averaged, forecasts made by experts or by forecasting
models about, say, macroeconomic indicators are consistently
more accurate than the typical estimate, and are sometimes
even the best estimate (e.g., Armstrong, 2001; Clemen, 1989;
Timmermann, 2006). Pooling just a few estimates is often
sufficient to tap into the power of averaging (e.g., Hogarth, 1978;
Johnson, Budescu, & Wallsten, 2001). This phenomenon is
known as the wisdom of crowds (Surowiecki, 2004).
Thus, the simple prescription for making good forecasts and
accurate estimates is as follows: Gather a few predictions or
estimates from sources that are likely to differ in their errors (an
issue to which we return shortly) and average them (Armstrong,
2001). Sometimes, however, an individual cannot exploit the
wisdom of the crowd—for instance, because other people are not
available, there is no time for consultation, or rules prohibit
communication. Think of the television game show ‘‘Who Wants
to Be a Millionaire?’’ which offers contestants increasingly large
cash prizes for correctly answering successive and increasingly
difficult general-knowledge questions. If a contestant is unsure
of an answer, he or she can use one or more ‘‘lifelines.’’ One
such lifeline is to ask audience members to choose which an-
swer they believe is correct, and the answer receiving the most
votes nearly always proves to be correct (Surowiecki, 2004).
According to the rules of the game, however, the contestant can
use this lifeline only once. How else can he or she exploit the
wisdom of the many?
We propose that people can enhance the quality of their
quantitative judgments by averaging their first estimate with a
second, dialectical estimate. Originating from the same person,
a dialectical estimate has a different error than the first estimate
to the extent that it is based on different knowledge and as-
sumptions. We call this approach to boosting accuracy in
quantitative estimation dialectical bootstrapping. ‘‘Bootstrap-
ping’’ alludes to Baron Mu¨nchhausen, who claimed to have es-
caped from a swamp by pulling himself up by, depending on who
tells the story, his own hair or bootstraps. ‘‘Dialectical’’ refers to
the Hegelian process of development, which has three stages:
thesis (first estimate), antithesis (dialectical estimate), and
synthesis (aggregation). By means of dialectical bootstrapping,
the wisdom of crowds can be simulated by a single mind that
averages its own conflicting opinions. We now review research on
averaging estimates, then outline the dialectical-bootstrapping
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approach, and finally report an empirical demonstration that
dialectical bootstrapping works.
WHEN MORE IS SMARTER
How can a set of individually mediocre estimates become
superior when averaged? The secret is a statistical fact that,
although well known in measurement theory, has implications
that are often not intuitively evident (Larrick & Soll, 2006; Soll,
1999). A subjective quantitative estimate can be expressed as
an additive function of three components: the truth (the true
value of the estimated quantity), random error (random fluctu-
ations in the judge’s performance), and systematic error (i.e., the
judge’s systematic tendency to over- or underestimate the true
value). Averaging estimates increases accuracy in two ways: It
cancels out random error, and it can reduce systematic error.
This can be illustrated using the concept of bracketing (Larrick
& Soll, 2006). If two estimates are on the same side of the truth
(i.e., do not ‘‘bracket’’ the true value), averaging them will be
as accurate, on average, as randomly choosing one estimate. But
if two estimates bracket the true value (i.e., one overestimates
it and the other underestimates it), averaging the two will yield
a smaller absolute error than randomly choosing one of the
estimates.
Assume that the true value is 100, and two judges estimate it
to be 110 and 120, erring by 10 and 20 units, respectively.
Randomly choosing between their estimates gives an expected
error of 15, whereas averaging the estimates results in 115,
which is also off by 15. Now assume that the second judge’s
estimate is 80, rather than 120. In this case, although the two
judges’ estimates have the same absolute errors as before, they
lie on opposite sides of the true value. Because the second es-
timate still errs by 20 units, one can again expect an absolute
error of 15 when choosing randomly between the two estimates.
Averaging them, however, gives 95, an error of only 5 units!
Averaging, therefore, dominates the strategy of choosing
randomly between two estimates: Without bracketing, averaging
is as accurate as random choice, and with bracketing, averaging
beats random choice. More generally, averaging several esti-
mates reduces overall error as soon as at least one estimate falls
on the opposite side of the true value as the others. Bracketing
can arise from random error or different systematic errors (i.e.,
when some judges systematically overestimate and other judges
systematically underestimate the true value). Consequently, a
low correlation among the errors of a set of judges virtually
guarantees bracketing, making the average estimate more ac-
curate than an estimate by a randomly selected judge (Larrick &
Soll, 2006). Aggregating a few people’s estimates usually suf-
fices to boost accuracy, especially if the people have only
modestly correlated errors (e.g., Hogarth, 1978). But what if
estimates from other people cannot be used, as when the con-
testant on ‘‘Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?’’ has already used
the audience lifeline?
DIALECTICAL BOOTSTRAPPING
Our thesis is that it is possible to reduce estimation error within
one person by averaging his or her first estimate with a dialec-
tical second estimate that is at odds with the first one. As we
show shortly, this reduction is larger in magnitude than can be
expected by solely reducing random error.
When Does Dialectical Bootstrapping Work?
When is the average of two estimates more accurate than the first
estimate? An answer requires comparing errors.1 For the aver-
age of the first and dialectical estimates to beat the first estimate,
the dialectical estimate must lie within a gain range that
asymmetrically extends from truth (see Fig. 1a). The upper
boundary of this range is defined by the distance between the
first estimate and the true value. If the dialectical estimate lies
on the same side of the true value as the first estimate and is
farther from the true value, the average of the two estimates will
be less accurate than the first estimate. The lower boundary of
the gain range is the point on the opposite side of the true value
that is 3 times as far from the truth as the first estimate. If a
dialectical estimate is located exactly on this boundary, the
average of the two estimates will lie exactly as far from the true
value as the first estimate, giving equal accuracy. For example,
assume that the true value is 100. If the first estimate is 110 and
the dialectical estimate is 70 (i.e., identical with the lower
boundary), the average will be 90. Both the first estimate and the
average have an absolute error of 10 (see Fig. 1b). If the dia-
lectical estimate is 80 (above the lower boundary), however, the
average is 95 (with an absolute error of 5) and thus more accurate
than the first estimate (see Fig. 1c).
Three analytical observations about the gain range merit at-
tention. First, if the two estimates bracket the true value, the
error of the dialectical estimate can be almost 3 times as large as
the error of the first estimate and the average will still beat the
first estimate. If the estimates do not bracket the true value, the
dialectical estimate must be more accurate than the first esti-
mate for the average to win. Consequently, the more probable
bracketing is, the larger the error of the dialectical estimate can
become before the expected accuracy gain due to averaging
becomes negative. Second, regardless of bracketing, if the dia-
lectical estimate has a smaller error than the first estimate, av-
eraging will always improve accuracy. Third, the width of the
gain range decreases as the error of the first estimate decreases.
Note that this analysis is agnostic regarding the extent to which
the errors of the two estimates reflect random versus systematic
error. The critical range simply specifies the values of the dia-
lectical estimate for which averaging will improve judgment,
given the first estimate. In sum, as long as the errors of the first
1This is different from the question of when averaging two estimates is su-
perior to choosing between them (Larrick & Soll, 2006; Soll & Larrick, in
press). Our analysis deals with the question of when averaging two estimates is
superior to sticking with the first estimate.
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and dialectical estimate are nonredundant (i.e., they have
nonidentical random or systematic errors) and the dialectical
estimate is not too far off the mark, the dialectical average
will likely be more accurate than the first estimate (Herzog &
Hertwig, 2008).
How to Elicit Dialectical Estimates
How can one elicit a dialectical estimate that is likely to fall in
the gain range? We propose that any technique that prompts
people to generate the dialectical estimate using knowledge that
is at least partly different from the knowledge they used to
generate the first estimate can suffice. Retrieving different but
plausible information makes it likely that the second estimate
will be sufficiently accurate to fall inside the gain range and that
its error will be different from that of the first estimate, perhaps
even causing the second estimate to fall on the opposite side of
the true value, producing bracketing.
This proposal builds upon insights from debiasing research
(e.g., Arkes, 1991; Larrick, 2004). Take, for example, the
‘‘consider the opposite’’ technique (Lord, Lepper, & Preston,
1984) and related techniques (e.g., Hirt & Markman, 1995;
Hoch, 1985; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980), which
prompt people to consider knowledge that was previously
overlooked, ignored, or deemed inconsistent with current beliefs
by, for example, asking them to think of reasons why their first
judgment might be wrong. Such procedures have been shown to
successfully reduce, for instance, overconfidence in confidence
intervals (e.g., Soll & Klayman, 2004): Participants who were
asked to estimate one boundary (‘‘I am 90% sure that Oscar
Wilde was born after . . .’’) and only then the other (‘‘I am 90%
sure that Oscar Wilde was born before . . .’’) generated confi-
dence intervals that were better calibrated and more closely
centered on the truth than the intervals generated by partici-
pants who were asked to produce the intervals in one step. Soll
and Klayman (2004) suggested that the stepwise procedure
encourages ‘‘people to sample their knowledge twice, once for
a low estimate and again for a high estimate’’ (p. 300). Viewed
from the perspective of dialectical bootstrapping, the second
and first estimates are likely to have a different error. Soll
and Klayman argued that their finding ‘‘can be thought of as
analogous to the improvement in accuracy that is obtained by
averaging the opinions of two judges who have nonredundant
sources of information’’ (p. 300). Dialectical bootstrapping of-
fers a potential gain in accuracy by averaging two estimates
based on nonredundant knowledge from the same judge.
DIALECTICAL BOOTSTRAPPING: DOES IT WORK?
Is dialectical bootstrapping more than a theoretical possibility,
and if so, how well does it work? We examined these questions in
an empirical study in which participants first gave estimates in
response to a set of questions and then generated dialectical
estimates. To evaluate whether and to what extent dialectical
bootstrapping improves accuracy, we compared the accuracy
gains with an upper and a lower benchmark. The lower bench-
mark was the accuracy gain achieved by averaging the first es-
timate with a second estimate elicited simply by asking the
person to make another estimate (without instruction to generate
a dialectical estimate). The average of the two would tend to be
more accurate than the first estimate because part of the random
error would cancel out (e.g., Stewart, 2001; Vul & Pashler,
2008).2 If the accuracy gain afforded by dialectical bootstrap-


































Fig. 1. Gain range: the range of dialectical estimates that will yield an
increase in accuracy if averaged with the first estimate. The error of the
first estimate defines the upper and lower bound of the range (a). When
the dialectical estimate is identical to the lower bound (b), the dialectical
average and the first estimate are equally accurate. When the dialectical
estimate is within the gain range (c), the dialectical average is more
accurate than the first estimate.
2We assume that when asked the same question twice, a person will—unless
prompted otherwise—draw on roughly the same knowledge for both estimates.
Therefore, the systematic error inherent in his or her estimates will be ap-
proximately the same; only random error will vary. In this view, a second es-
timate is not just a degenerated copy of the first estimate, but rather represents a
second draw from an internal probability distribution (cf. Vul & Pashler, 2008).
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use a dialectical elicitation strategy for the second estimate. Just
asking people to estimate again would be enough.
The upper benchmark was the gain in accuracy achieved by
averaging the first estimate with an estimate from another per-
son, as in research on quantitative advice taking (Soll & Larrick,
in press; Yaniv, 2004). Because no two individuals are likely to
have identical knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that the
errors of their estimates are less correlated than the errors of first
and dialectical estimates provided by the same person (see
Ariely et al., 2000). Averaging a person’s first estimate with that
of a random person is thus likely to be superior to averaging a
person’s first estimate with its dialectical counterpart. To what
extent can dialectical bootstrapping surpass the mere reliability
gain by simulating the process behind this dyadic gain?
Method
Participants
Participants (N5 101) were students at the University of Basel.
For their participation, they received a flat fee of 10 Swiss francs
(ca. $9.50 at the time) or course credits, as well as the chance to
win one of two iPods in a lottery. Seventy-seven (76%) partici-
pants were female; 2 participants failed to report their gender.
Procedure
Using the on-line encyclopedia Wikipedia, we created a date-
estimation task by selecting 40 historical events (e.g., the dis-
covery of electricity), 10 each from the 16th, 17th, 18th, and
19th centuries. Date-estimation tasks have often been employed
in research on estimation and judgment aggregation (e.g., Soll &
Klayman, 2004; Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007). Each participant
was randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In both con-
ditions, participants first generated their estimates without
knowing that they would be asked later to generate a second
estimate. In the dialectical-bootstrapping condition, partici-
pants (n 5 50) were then asked to give dialectical estimates
(while their first estimates were displayed in front of them) using
a technique inspired by the consider-the-opposite strategy:
First, assume that your first estimate is off the mark. Second, think
about a few reasons why that could be. Which assumptions and
considerations could have been wrong? Third, what do these new
considerations imply? Was the first estimate rather too high or too
low? Fourth, based on this new perspective, make a second,
alternative estimate.
Before rendering their dialectical estimates, participants were
informed that the more accurate of the two estimates for each
question would be selected and that the chances of winning an
iPod would increase as the absolute errors of these ‘‘better’’
estimates decreased. Thus, participants could dare to make a
different estimate because only the better of the two estimates
would count. This incentive scheme should foster bold second
estimates.
In the reliability condition (n5 51), participants simply made
a second estimate. No consider-the-opposite instruction was
provided, and first estimates were not displayed while partici-
pants made their second estimates. Before making their second
estimates, participants were informed that one of the two esti-
mates (first or second) for each question would be randomly
selected and that the absolute errors of these selected estimates
would determine the chance of winning an iPod. This incentive
scheme embodies the aim of the reliability condition, namely, to
elicit a participant’s ‘‘best’’ estimate on both occasions in order
to quantify reliability gains.
We employed two orderings of the 40 items (a random ordering
and its reverse). Order of items had no influence on any of the
analyses reported here; we therefore pooled the estimates across
task orders.3
Results
For each participant, we calculated the median absolute devi-
ation between his or her estimates and the actual dates; then, we
averaged this measure across participants. In terms of this ac-
curacy measure, first estimates were off by 130.8 years (SD 5
30.7, Mdn5 132.5), repeated estimates were off by 126.5 years
(SD5 32.4,Mdn5 131.0), and dialectical estimates were off by
123.2 years (SD 5 26.8, Mdn 5 122.5). In the reliability con-
dition, the first and second estimates for each question were
nearly identically accurate, with a mean within-participants
difference of 0.4 (SD5 6.7; Mdn5 0.0; confidence interval, or
CI 5 0.0–11.4; d 5 0.06). In the dialectical-bootstrapping
condition, the second estimates were somewhat, but not reliably,
more accurate than their respective first estimates (within-
participants difference: M5 4.5, SD5 19.6; Mdn5 3.0; CI5
1.0–110.4; d 5 0.23).
To see whether dialectical bootstrapping pays, we compared
accuracy gain in the dialectical-bootstrapping and reliability
conditions. The accuracy gain for a participant was defined as
the median decrease in error of the average of the two estimates
relative to the first estimate, across items. As expected, accuracy
in the reliability condition increased as a result of aggrega-
tion. However, as Figure 2 shows, this reliability gain was very
small, averaging 0.3 percentage point (SD5 2.3%; Mdn5 0%;
CI 5 0.0%–0.8%; d 5 0.12). In comparison, dialectical boot-
strapping improved accuracy by an order of magnitude: 4.1
percentage points (SD 5 7.8%; Mdn 5 3.6%; CI 5 2.0%–
6.4%)—an effect of medium size (d5 0.53). Figure 3 shows the
3We used robust statistical methods for the statistical analyses (e.g., Wilcox,
2001). We report 20%-trimmed means, the corresponding 95% confidence
intervals (percentile bootstrap method; Wilcox & Keselman, 2003), medians,
and a robust estimator for the standard deviation (Sn; Rousseeuw & Croux,
1993). All averages of two estimates were rounded, so any superiority of the
averages cannot be explained by their being more fine grained than the raw
estimates. We report effect sizes using Cohen’s d (1988).
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distribution of the dialectical gains across participants. Nearly
three fourths of participants (36 of 50, or 72%) benefited from
dialectical bootstrapping. Two participants neither benefited nor
suffered as a result of the technique. For about one fourth of
participants (12 of 50, 24%), accuracy actually decreased.
Although dialectical bootstrapping boosts accuracy, it cannot
quite emulate the wisdom of the many. As Figure 2 shows,
averaging each person’s first estimate for a given item with that of
a random other person in the study yielded an average dyadic
gain of 7.1 percentage points (SD 5 8.3%; Mdn 5 6.7%; CI 5
5.0%–9.4%)—an effect of large size (d5 0.86).4 Thus, a person
could have achieved a higher accuracy by asking another person
for estimates than by using his or her own dialectical estimates
(within-participants differences: M 5 3.4%, SD 5 10.3%;
Mdn 5 3.5%; CI 5 0.2%–16.2%; d 5 0.33). Nevertheless,
one’s own second, dialectical opinion is worth half the opinion of
another judge.
The differences in reliability, dialectical, and dyadic gains
were mirrored in the bracketing rates. Merely repeating the
estimation process had the lowest bracketing rate, 7.9% (CI 5
6.1%–10.2%). In contrast, the first and the dialectical estimates
bracketed the true value in 13.6% (CI 5 11.1%–16.9%) of
cases. Finally, one participant’s first estimate and that of another
person bracketed the true value in 17.6% (CI5 16.8%–18.5%)
of cases.
What caused the larger gain in the dialectical-bootstrapping
condition relative to the reliability condition: the consider-
the-opposite strategy or the different incentive scheme? In the
dialectical-bootstrapping condition, the better of the two esti-
mates determined the chance to win an iPod, whereas in the
reliability condition, a randomly selected estimate did so. To
rule out the possibility that the use of the different incentive
scheme can account for the key difference found in this study, we
ran a new reliability condition that was identical to the previous
one except that participants’ (N 5 50) chance to win was de-
termined by the better of the two estimates (as in the dialectical-
bootstrapping condition). The averaging gains were close to
those in the original reliability condition and much smaller than
the dialectical gains (M5 0.7%, SD5 3.6%; Mdn5 0%; CI5
0.3%–1.7%; d 5 0.20). Thus, the method of determining the
chance of winning in the dialectical-bootstrapping condition per
se did not produce the larger accuracy gains in that condition.
DIALECTICAL BOOTSTRAPPING: A MENTALTOOL
TO FOSTER ACCURACY
Part of the wisdom of the many resides in an individual mind.
Our study provides an empirical demonstration that averaging
two estimates from the same person—one of which is a dialec-
tical estimate—can improve accuracy beyond mere reliability
gains. Although averaging repeated estimates from the same
person is known to foster accuracy by reducing random error
(e.g., Vul & Pashler, 2008), the notion of averaging two some-
what contradictory estimates from the same person is, to the best
of our knowledge, novel. We also outlined the conditions under
which averaging two estimates by one person reduces error
relative to the person’s first estimate alone (thus going beyond
the work by, for instance, Einhorn, Hogarth, & Klempner, 1977,
Repeated Dialectical Other Person's
















Fig. 2. Accuracy gain obtained by averaging two estimates. The graph
shows the mean gain obtained when the original estimate was averaged
with the repeated estimate in the reliability condition, when the original
estimate was averaged with the dialectical estimate in the dialectical-
bootstrapping condition, and when the original estimate of a participant
in the dialectical-bootstrapping condition was averaged with the original
estimate of a randomly selected other person. Ninety-five percent confi-



















Fig. 3. Distribution of the magnitude of the dialectical gain across par-
ticipants. Each bar represents a participant’s gain (sorted in descending
order).
4We simulated the dyadic gain for a question by pairing a given participant’s
first estimate with the respective first estimates of all other participants, one at a
time, thus calculating the expected accuracy gain across the simulated dyads.
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and Soll & Larrick, in press). Moreover, the current approach
interprets debiasing strategies such as ‘‘consider the opposite’’
as potential tools to produce judgments with different errors,
thus connecting research on debiasing (e.g., Larrick, 2004) with
research on judgment aggregation (e.g., Einhorn et al., 1977;
Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Soll & Larrick, in press; Yaniv, 2004).
Are there ways of improving on mere reliability gains apart
from using the consider-the-opposite strategy employed here?
Vul and Pashler (2008) showed that increasing the time delay
between two repeated estimates also boosts gains produced by
averaging. They reasoned that ‘‘temporal separation of guesses
increases the benefit of within-person averaging by increasing
the independence of guesses’’ (p. 647), attenuating the an-
choring effect of the first estimate. That is, letting time elapse
between elicitation of the first and the second estimates also
enables use of nonredundant knowledge. The consider-the-
opposite strategy, as used here, makes it possible to instanta-
neously exploit the boost in accuracy gained from asking oneself
the same question twice.
Dialectical bootstrapping is a simple mental tool that fosters
accuracy by leveraging people’s capacity to construct conflicting
realities. We do not claim that people spontaneously make use of
this tool. Rather, we suggest that after learning about the power
of averaging and its key requirement—which can be described
on a proximal level as generating good estimates based on
different knowledge and on a distal level as producing valid
estimates with modestly correlated errors—anyone can benefit
from dialectical bootstrapping. Although limited to the domain
of quantitative estimates and predictions, this mental tool has a
versatility stemming from its general statistical rationale. We
do not confine dialectical bootstrapping to the consider-the-
opposite strategy. Rather, we suggest that any elicitation pro-
cedure that taps into somewhat nonredundant, yet plausible
knowledge is potentially capable of eliciting effective dialectical
estimates. In fact, we observed dialectical gains similar to the
ones reported here in people’s forecasts of parliamentary election
outcomes. In a study in which people twice predicted the rep-
resentation of the Swiss political parties that would result from
the 2007 election, we found dialectical gains when participants
were asked to make predictions both from their own perspective
and from the perspective of a dissimilar other person.
The French poet Paul Vale´ry once said, ‘‘Je ne suis pas tou-
jours de mon avis’’ (‘‘I don’t always agree with myself’’; Vale´ry,
1957–1961, p. 760). Vacillating between opinions can be ago-
nizing. But as dialectical bootstrapping illustrates, being of two
minds can also work to one’s advantage.
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